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COMMENTARY: BRADY'S
BRAINTEASER: THE ACCIDENTAL
PROSECUTOR AND COGNITIVE BIAS
Alafair Burket
INTRODUCTION
In his Article, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors
Play,1 Professor Gershman rightly argues that it is bad for prosecutors
to play Hide and Seek or Blind Man's Bluff with Brady material. It is
bad to treat one's constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence as a gamble or a scavenger hunt. It is bad for prosecutors to
play all of these games. Rather than disagree with Professor
Gershman, I'd like to flesh out a point about a prosecutor's disclosure
that I think, unfortunately, could get lost if we place too much
emphasis on the comparison to games-in particular, if we take too
literally the post-colon portion of this panel's title: "Games
Prosecutors Play to Avoid Compliance."
To say that prosecutors play games to avoid compliance with
Brady is to suggest that Brady itself is perfectly sound doctrine and
that defendants would be in a fine position to have a fair shot in the
adversarial system, just so long as those wily prosecutors would set
aside their evil games, play fair, and comply with Brady. The story is
more complicated, as Professor Gershman acknowledges in his piece,
because the Brady doctrine itself invites many of the prosecutorial
tactics that can be depicted as unfair gamesmanship.
t Professor, Hofstra Law School. My thanks to Case Western Reserve Law School for
inviting me to participate in this symposium and to Professor Bennett Gershman for the
opportunity to comment on his Article.
1 Bennett L. Gershran, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE
WES. L. REv. 531 (2007).
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Without disagreeing with any of Professor Gershman's
observations about purposeful, knowing, or ostrich-like prosecutorial
failures to disclose evidence that qualifies as Brady material, I will
talk about a problem that others have mentioned today but have not
explored: how virtuous prosecutors-acting in good faith and trying
to comply with Brady-might still fail to turn over exculpatory
evidence. To continue the analogy of games, what I am exploring is
not a game that prosecutors consciously play to avoid Brady, but
instead a brainteaser that Brady itself forces prosecutors to engage in.
BRADY'S BRAINTEASER
As we know, the prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence, as defined by the Supreme Court, is limited by
the materiality requirement. So when a previously paraphrased local
prosecutor says, "it is not misconduct if I don't get reversed," he takes
a defensible view, at least as far as Brady is concerned. Brady
requires prosecutors to disclose if, and only if, the evidence at issue,
viewed in light of the entirety of the case, is sufficient to undermine
confidence in the proceeding's outcome.2 In other words, Brady
requires a prosecutor who is deciding whether to disclose evidence, ex
ante, to apply the same standard an appellate court would use ex post
to decide whether to reverse a conviction if the prosecutor has not
disclosed.
By requiring a comparison of the potentially exculpatory evidence
against the rest of the evidence in the case-remember, the case that
hasn't been tried yet-Brady creates a brainteaser for the prosecutor
who is trying to give literal compliance with Brady. The prosecutor
must first envision the trial: "What do I think the evidence is going to
look like once the case plays out?" And in step two of the brain
teaser, the prosecutor is asked to hold up this piece of evidence at
issue against everything else and say, "Do I think this piece of
evidence is sufficient to undermine my confidence in a guilty verdict I
haven't yet achieved based on the rest of the evidence?"
Now, we have all been stumped by brainteasers before. That is
because all good brainteasers prey upon common fallacies in human
cognition. I would like to focus on how the Brady standard preys
upon cognitive biases that everyone, not just prosecutors, shares. My
argument is that these cognitive biases introduce non-random errors
into the system. It is not simply that prosecutors sometimes
undervalue materiality, and sometimes overvalue it. Rather, Brady
2 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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invites prosecutors to systematically undervalue the materiality of
evidence.
COGNITIVE BIASES
The first cognitive bias I want to talk about is confirmation bias.
We have all heard that good scientists are supposed to seek out
information that would disprove their own theory. The best way to
prove your theory is to first attempt to disprove it; the failure to
disprove a theory is proof that it may be correct.
Social science evidence indicates that instead, when humans try to
test a theory, we look only for evidence that confirms that theory. For
example, in one frequently cited study,3 researchers told half of their
subjects to write out questions that they would ask a person to
determine if that person was an extrovert, and told the other half of
the subjects to write down questions to determine whether a person
was an introvert. The subjects demonstrated classic confirmation bias.
Those who were trying to test for extroversion would ask questions
such as, "What do you do to liven up things at a party?" Those who
were looking for evidence of introversion would ask questions like,
"What is it about large groups that makes you feel uncomfortable?"
These questions elicit answers that only support the subjects'
operating theories, not disprove them if wrong. A suspected introvert,
for example, would be encouraged to discuss what makes him
uncomfortable at a party, without being asked whether parties, as a
whole, in fact make him uncomfortable.
There is also evidence of confirmation bias in recall. When people
are trying to test a theory by searching their own knowledge, they
retrieve information from memory in a biased manner. For example,
in another well-known study,4 all subjects were shown a list of
attributes for a hypothetical woman named Jane. Some of these
attributes suggested that Jane was an extrovert, some suggested she
was an introvert, and some were neutral. Some days later, each
subject was asked a question about Jane. Half of the subjects were
asked, "Do you think Jane would be a good real estate agent?" These
subjects tended to recall things about Jane that were consistent with
extroversion, such as the fact that Jane struck up a conversation with a
stranger. The other half of the subjects, who had been shown the same
exact list of attributes about the hypothetical woman, were asked
Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social
Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202 (1978).
4 Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, Testing Hypotheses About Other People: The Use of
Historical Knowledge, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 330 (1979).
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whether Jane would make a good librarian. These subjects recalled
seemingly introverted facts, such as Jane's preference to take her
coffee break by herself. In sum, people recall information from
memory in a manner that is biased toward supporting their current
hypothesis.
Another cognitive bias is selective information processing. This
term is used to describe people's tendency to evaluate evidence based
on their existing beliefs. If we don't recognize this in ourselves, we
all at least recognize it in others with whom we've disagreed. We've
all argued with someone who refuses to budge from his or her
position. If you point out some objective piece of evidence that
contradicts their theory, they undermine it. They may say, "That must
be made up," or, "That sounds like junk statistics to me," or, "That
can't be right." This kind of maddening reasoning is an example of
selective information processing.
Here is another example from the social science literature.5
Subjects were given contradictory empirical studies about the death
penalty, one purporting to show that capital punishment was a
deterrent against crime, one purporting to show it was no deterrent at
all. Those subjects who walked into the room favoring capital
punishment thought the study showing it was a deterrent was well-
conducted, but criticized the format of the study purporting to show
no deterrence. Meanwhile, those subjects who walked into the room
opposed to the death penalty found numerous problems with the pro-
capital punishment study, as opposed to the study finding no deterrent
effect. As a result of selective information processing, the subjects
became more convinced of their own pre-existing views, even though
they had all been exposed to the same contradictory information.
THE INFLUENCE OF COGNITIVE BIASES ON BRADY'S BRAINTEASER
Let us assume for a second that prosecutors are human. The last
time I checked, all the ones I knew were carbon-based. If we know
that people generally suffer from cognitive biases like selective
information processing, it is only natural to assume that prosecutors
fall prey to these same cognitive fallacies.
Look at how Brady's brain teaser invites even virtuous prosecutors
to systematically undervalue materiality. Take a simple example.
Suppose a prosecutor has a robbery case and learns that a critical
eyewitness is a chronic alcoholic. The prosecutor doesn't actually
5 Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
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know whether the eyewitness was drunk on the night of the robbery;
she could very well have been sober. For purposes of our
hypothetical, we have to assume that the prosecutor continues to
believe the witness provided an accurate account because we are,
after all, supposing a virtuous prosecutor. If the information were
such that the prosecutor herself no longer believed the defendant was
guilty, our virtuous prosecutor would dismiss the case.
Thus, it is just a question of whether the prosecutor has to tell the
defense attorney that her witness is a chronic alcoholic. To apply
Brady, the prosecutor first has to envision the trial without the
disclosure of the witness's alcoholism. Because of confirmation bias,
as she retrieves the evidence in the case from memory, she is likely to
recall facts that support her existing belief in guilt, such as the
existence of another eyewitness, the defendant's inculpatory
admissions, or the fact that the defendant was found in possession of
some of the robbery proceeds in a search incident to arrest. In
addition, selective information processing comes into play. While
evaluating all of the evidence that suggests the defendant is guilty, the
prosecutor will say to herself, "It sounds like very good evidence of
guilt. I still believe he is guilty."
In her analysis, the prosecutor is not likely to emphasize facts that
might undermine her existing belief in the defendant's guilt. Perhaps
the defendant's inculpatory admissions were accompanied by
exculpatory denials. Maybe his statements were made under police
pressure. Perhaps some of robbery proceeds are missing, with no
explanation for their whereabouts. Maybe the other eyewitness also
suffers from memory or credibility problems. Because of
confirmation bias, the prosecutor may not even consider these facts
when she envisions her case. She may recall only the evidence that
suggests the defendant's guilt. Even if she does consider these
exculpatory facts, she may give them short shrift because of selective
information processing. In short, she is going to overestimate the
strength of her own case.
The second step of Brady requires her to evaluate the exculpatory
value of the evidence at issue in the context of the entirety of the case.
But because of the cognitive biases at play in the first step, she has an
inflated estimate of the strength of her own case. And because of
selective information processing, she is going to scrutinize the
potentially exculpatory evidence for flaws. So what if her witness is a
chronic alcoholic? It doesn't mean the witness was drunk on the night
of the robbery. Even so drunks can still make accurate IDs. Because
the prosecutor underestimates the exculpatory value of the evidence at
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issue, and overestimates the inculpatory value of everything else, she
may conclude that the witness's alcoholism does not make a
difference. Accordingly, she may decide not to disclose the
information. This is not because she is trying to avoid Brady by
playing games, but because she is trying to solve the brain teaser
created by the Brady doctrine itself. At each step of the analysis,
Brady invites cognitive biases that will systematically cause
prosecutors to undervalue materiality.
I choose to emphasize this particular game-Brady's game, rather
than prosecutors' games-for a couple of reasons. First, I think it
shapes the direction of reform. Some in this Symposium have
suggested that prosecutors should be disciplined more, disbarred
more, or even prosecuted criminally for Brady violations. However,
upping the sanctions for purposeful violations is unlikely to alter the
decision making of prosecutors who unwittingly and accidentally fail
to disclose exculpatory information.
Secondly, it is important as a narrative matter to explore how even
virtuous prosecutors might fail to disclose exculpatory evidence. If
we discuss only glaring, purposeful violations, or even ostrich-like
willful blindness, ethical prosecutors can quickly disregard the
conduct of a few unethical lawyers without appreciating how they
could still fall prey to Brady's traps themselves.
Many prosecutors believe and say to themselves, "I don't need to
worry about these things. I don't violate Brady. I would never do that.
I am out to do justice," without considering the possibility that they
might unwittingly err while trying to do the right thing. Explaining
prosecutorial decision making through the lens of cognitive bias is a
way to include prosecutors in a discussion of these problems and
perhaps even in the solutions.
[Vol. 57:3
